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Keynote Abstracts 
Havi Carel 
Havi Carel grew up in Tel Aviv, where she completed a BA in Philosophy Single Honours (1994) and 
an MA in History and Philosophy of Science (1998). She came to the UK in 1998 to study for her PhD, 
on the concept of death, which she completed in 2002, at the University of Essex, under the supervision 
of Simon Critchley. 
Upon graduation she took up a lectureship at the University of York, and then spent two yea rs in 
Australia, working at the Australian National University in Canberra. She returned to the UK in 2006, and 
worked at UWE, Bristol until coming to Bristol in 2013. 
Havi was made Professor of Philosophy at the University of Bristol in 2014. Her research examines the 
experience of illness and of receiving healthcare. In 2014 she was awarded a Senior Investigator Award by 
the Wellcome Trust, for a five year project entitled ‘Life of Breath’ (with Prof Jane Macnaughton, Durham 
University).  
She recently completed a monograph for Oxford University Press, entitled Phenomenology of Illness (out 
in September 2016) and she previously published on the embodied experience of illness, epistemic 
injustice, wellbeing within illness and on the experience of respiratory illness in the Lancet, BMJ, Journal of 
Medicine and Philosophy, Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics, Medicine, Healthcare and Philosophy, and in edited 
collections.  
Havi is the author of Illness (2008, 2013), shortlisted for the Wellcome Trust Book Prize, and of Life and 
Death in Freud and Heidegger (2006). She is the co-editor of Health, Illness and Disease (2012) and of What 
Philosophy Is (2004). She uses film in teaching and has co-edited a volume entitled New Takes in Film-
Philosophy (2010). She also co-edited a special issue of Philosophy on ‘Human Experience and Nature’ (2013). 
In 2009-11 Havi led an AHRC-funded project on the concepts of health, illness and disease. In 2011-
12 she was awarded a Leverhulme Fellowship for a project entitled ‘The Lived Experience of Illness’. In 
2012-13 she held a British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship. 
http://bristol.academia.edu/HaviCarel 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/school-of-arts/people/havi-h-carel/index.html 
 
Invisible Suffering: A Phenomenology of  Breathlessness 
In this talk I present a phenomenological framework for the understanding of the experience of 
breathlessness. I suggest that the experience of breathlessness is total and overwhelming to the sufferer, 
but also largely invisible to the outsider. How does this tension affect respiratory medicine and clinical 
work? How could the first person experience of breathlessness be harnessed in the clinic? And what can 
phenomenology offer this process? The talk will also discuss the Wellcome Trust-funded Life of Breath 
project that engages philosophy and other humanities disciplines to explore these questions. 
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Felix Ó Murchadha 
Felix Ó Murchadha is a Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Ireland, Galway 
(Ireland). A former Fulbright Scholar he has published articles, papers, books and book chapters on 
Phenomenology, in particular, Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Levinas, philosophy of religion, and 
the philosophy of violence. He has recently published two monographs The Time of Revolution: Kairos and 
Chronos in Heidegger London: Bloomsbury, 2013) and A Phenomenology of Christian Life: Glory and Night 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013). He is presently working on a book provisionally entitled 
“The Fidelity of Reason and the Rationality of Faith: A Phenomenology of the Self”.   
Speaking after the Phenomenon: Faith and the Passion of  Being 
Phenomenology speaks not directly of phenomena but rather of the appearing of phenomena. In so 
speaking we move from the level of things with generic or proper names, the level of things which are 
present or potentially so, to the level of universal terms and that which cannot be present, that past which 
was never present and that future which will never be fulfilled. This situation which grounds 
phenomenology can be expressed in the preposition ‘after’ understood in its twofold meaning: coming 
later and going in pursuit. In speaking of the appearing of what appears we are speaking after the 
phenomenon, in particular after the ‘promise’ which every phenomenon holds. Speaking after is a desiring, 
which needs to be heard in a twofold manner: To desire something is to lack it, but also to have it in its 
excess, as that which exceeds what is present. We have then a constellation of three spheres: time (the 
temporality of ‘after’), desire (the dynamics of lack and excess) and language (the expression of what is in 
speech). This paper will discuss the relation of these three spheres to one another with respect to the mode 
of being of the speaking and thinking self towards things. In doing so it will make a case for understanding 
Phenomenology as a form of First Philosophy or Metaphysics situated between faith and reason. 
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Darian Meacham 
Darian Meacham is a lecturer in philosophy at UWE, Bristol and from October 2016 will join the 
philosophy department at Maastricht University, Netherlands. He also works with BrisSynBio, a Synthetic 
Biology Research Centre based at University of Bristol, as the researcher in ethics of technology and 
'responsible innovation'. Some recent projects include Maine de Biran, The Relationship Between the Physical and 
the Moral in Man (Bloomsbury 2016) and Thinking After Europe: Jan Patočka and Politics (Rowman and 
Littlefield 2016), with Francesco Tava. He is currently also working on a project concerning automation, 
basic income and work, and has recently written for openDemocracy.net on the topic.   
 
Twitter: @posteurope  
Website: https://westengland.academia.edu/DarianMeacham 
Phenomenology of  Technology: How Low Can You Go? BioEnactivism, Phenomenology and 
Cognitive Biology 
The branch of enactive philosophy known as bio-enactivism seek to extend enactivist analyses of 
embodied cognition to the field of the living per se, such that enactive sense-making becomes not only the 
fundamental characteristic of mind, but also of life (Thompson 2007, 2011; Di Paolo 2009; De Jesus 2015, 
2016). These philosophers insist upon a ‘strong mind life continuity thesis.’ In short, mind is a continuation 
or development of activity – an inflationary notion of cognizing – that is found in all life. There remains 
in this work a strong emphasis on subjectivity and a ‘whole organism approach.’ By looking at recent 
research in cognitive biology and protocell construction, I pose the question of how far down embodied 
cognition really goes? Can we talk about embodied cognition at the level of individual proteins? And if so, 
are we still talking about the same thing as enactivists do when they talk about human cognition. I argue 
that in order to make a substantial argument about the relation between life and mind, enactivism needs 
to be supported by an ontology similar to what we find in instances of a-subjective phenomenology and 
French biophilosophy. 
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Paper Abstracts 
Panel A: Developing Sartre and Merleau-Ponty 
Elisa Magri: Is Phenomenology a Form of  Empathy? 
In this paper, I shall interrogate whether and how a phenomenological approach to pathologies of self-
awareness enables us not only to describe the nature of those states, but also to empathically grasp them. 
Following Ratcliffe (2012), I shall argue that phenomenology, as a method, facilitates a distinct type of 
empathy (radical empathy), one that expands the range of intelligible experiences. However, I shall consider 
whether and how the phenomenological method allows different ways to reduce and analyse the same 
phenomenon. With regard to this issue, I shall propose a distinct case study, i.e. obsessions and the 
experience of lived space by looking at Sartre’s and Merleau-Ponty’s different methods. I will show that, 
while Sartre and Merleau-Ponty anticipate an empathic understanding of obsessive states, they offer two 
different interpretative models for their investigation. With regard to this issue, I shall reconsider the 
phenomenological reduction and its relation to pathologies of self-awareness in light of the possibilities of 
radical empathy. 
Robert Booth: Merleau-Ponty, Correlationism, and Alterity 
The very possibility of a suitably environmentally-focused (eco)phenomenology has been challenged 
through the recent upsurge of speculative realist metaphysics. A common speculative realist commitment 
holds that phenomenologists cannot adequately address more-than-human entities on their own terms 
because phenomenology is paradigmatically correlationist. The standard charge of correlationism holds 
that because the phenomenological subject actively structures all of its experience, phenomenology can 
only ever make sense of the world as correlate for the (human) subject, rather than the world as it is in-
itself beyond or before the subject. Correlationism purportedly leads to unpalatable conclusions (e.g. 
technoscientific instrumentalism, large-scale environmental degradation caused by rampant consumerism, 
exclusionary anthropocentric politics) for the more-than-human world thereby reduced. In this paper I 
address the correlationist charge against Merleau-Pontian phenomenology in two ways. Firstly, I intend to 
show that if Merleau-Ponty does advance a correlationist phenomenology, this is because of a well-justified 
desire to retain the genuine alterity of other parties revealed in experience, serious engagement with which 
is paradoxically better attuned to something like correlationist philosophy. Secondly, I intend to explore 
the carnality of the body-subject to problematize the claim that Merleau-Ponty advances a correlationist 
philosophy, at least in any seriously detrimental sense. Ultimately, I hope to show that, partly by reinstating 
the centrality of the body to (radically-reflective) phenomenological investigation, Merleau-Ponty can 
nullify the problems supposedly introduced by correlationism even if the charge is true.  
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Panel B: History and Time 
Tony O’Connor: Making Phenomenology Effective 
I address Dan Zahavi’s critique of Jean-Luc Marion on the possibility of unifying competing practices 
and goals of phenomenology as found in the alternative approaches of Husserl and Heidegger.   
Marion favours Heideggerian fundamental ontology over Husserlian transcendental phenomenology.  
He thinks that Husserl fails to address Heidegger’s question of what unites and makes possible our varied 
senses of what it is to be, because Husserl never understood Heidegger’s concern with ontological 
difference, or a difference in Being. 
Zahavi thinks that Marion’s criticism is invalid because Husserl has investigated phenomenality, or the 
nature of phenomena.  Further, Husserl analysed the non-objectifying mode of Being of consciousness, 
and discussed the interplay between presence and absence.  This shows the limitations of Marion’s view 
of Husserl. 
I shall argue that both Zahavi’s and Marion’s positions are flawed because they do not give adequate 
weight to the hermeneutical claim that humans are always involved interpretively in contingent pre-shaping 
traditions and cultural contexts. I shall support this with the views of Gadamer, Merleau-Ponty and 
Foucault.   
Gadamer’s notions of effective historical consciousness and the fusion of horizons are valuable.   They 
show how humans are inseparably embodied behaviourally and linguistically in the world and its cultural 
traditions.  Historically-effected consciousness shows that our involvement in the world involves our pre-
formation by contextual interpretational backgrounds, which we, in turn, shape and reshape.  Contextual 
understanding and interpretation operate within and across horizons and history, the understanding and 
interpretation of which is never finished. 
This gives weight to Merleau-Ponty’s account of the task of effective phenomenology, namely, to 
recover a historicized phenomenology that revises the usual essentialist notions of necessity and 
contingency.  It involves an anticipation of Foucault’s archaeological finding regarding the ‘historical 
apriori’, which allows the reinterpretation of Husserl’s and Heidegger’s themes in historicist terms. 
Andrea Rehberg: Zur Zukunft der Zukünftigen / Towards the Future of  the Ones to Come 
Recent years have seen a number of works on time, specifically futurity, as a central issue in 
phenomenology (e.g., Reynolds, Lawlor, Hoy, and DeRoo). Without going into any detailed discussion of 
this literature, some points made in it will form the backdrop to this paper. Specifically, charting the  path 
that leads from, on the one hand, the understanding of the issue of futurity in phenomenology to, on the 
other hand, the futural possibilities of phenomenology as a discipline, will be the chief concern of this 
presentation. But since these are far-reaching and complex matters, and since a broad overview of them is 
neither possible nor desirable in the time available, in the main part of the paper I will mobilise some of 
Heidegger’s thoughts, both early and late, on the matter to help us chart the above-mentioned path.  
Departing from Heidegger’s beyng-historical (seynsgeschichtliche) investigations, above all in the Beiträge, 
in Die Geschichte des Seyns, and the lectures “Identity and Difference” and “Time and Being”, I will first set 
out the connections between Er-eignis/Ent-eignis, Dasein’s dispositions of presentiment (Ahnung) and 
restraint (Verhaltenheit) as appropriate to this reciprocal event, and Heidegger’s projection of the futural 
ones or the ones to come (die Zukünftigen). From out of this nexus a notion of futurity emerges that is 
simultaneously to be understood in terms of anticipatory resoluteness as the condition of possibility of all 
presencing (familiar from Being and Time), and as a structural element in the moment, glance or blink of  
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the eye (Augenblick) itself. Taken in both of these senses, what the notion of futurity thereby loses is any 
reference to a merely ontically conceived future. This in turn helps us to grasp more clearly the two senses 
of the ‘future’ of phenomenology, set out above.  
 
Panel C: Ethics, Politics, and Violence 
Ashika L. Singh: Dwelling, Building and Homelessness 
The ‘home’ is at the heart of discourse surrounding Heidegger’s being-in-the-world qua dwelling. While 
this starting-point is novel, it is problematically contrasted with homelessness, even by the most politically 
liberal of phenomenologists (such as, Edward Casey). Although efforts have been made to problematize 
and politicise the home (particularly by feminist thinkers), little focus is placed on its devalued counterpart. 
In this paper, I argue that we continue to privilege the home and so ignore the consequences both 
conceptual and material of this dichotomisation. This is ultimately shortsighted, philosophically and socio-
politically. I criticise the existential circumspection of homelessness found in Heideggarian anti -modernism 
and place this circumspection back into its concrete origins. This criticism therefore attacks Heidegger’s 
(and Casey’s) implicit reification of the home as the patriarchal household (oikos) and the equation of 
modern Unheimlichkeit with the city and homelessness found within. The problem hereby addressed in this 
paper is the devaluation of homelessness to a lack of a home. To reveal why this devaluation occurs, I will 
sketch out a deconstruction of the binary. In doing this, I will show that the home-homelessness distinction 
is accounted for in the distinction between house and urban space and ultimately in the distinction between 
private and public spheres. It is my contention that it is not so much ‘modernity’ that incurs a persistent 
state of homelessness, but the exclusionary and oppressive nature of the demarcation of place via capital. 
In turn, I claim that Heideggarian dwelling sustains the perception of homelessness that informs aggressive 
anti-homeless public policy. While there is undeniable merit in phenomenological conceptions of dwelling, 
I insist that the Heideggarian dweller neglects the liberating potential of cities and the radical significance 
of homelessness.  
Petr Kouba: Phenomenology of  Sacrifice 
The phenomenon of sacrifice has been analyzed by Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bataille, and many other 
philosophers. In my paper I intend to examine the phenomenon of sacrifice from the phenomenological 
point of view as outlined by Jan Patočka, Jean-Luc Nancy and Jean-Luc Marion. With their help I would 
like to differentiate several kinds of sacrifice (strategic, moral, political, and religious), but above all I am 
interested in the limits of sacrifice. Provided that the fields of morality, politics and religion are opened by 
sacrifice, is there any morality, politics and religion without one? And if so, what is the meaning of morality, 
politics and religion that are not based on some kind of sacrifice? These questions seem essential in our 
time, when the meaning of sacrifice is compromised by acts of terrorism. It is relatively easy to denounce 
terrorism and its propaganda, which uses the concept of martyrdom, as an inauthentic approach to the 
experience of sacrifice (Marion). But how could we break its spell if we believe that sacrifice brings our 
existence to completeness (Patočka)? How can we avoid the inauthentic forms of sacrifice, if we believe 
that without sacrifice we must fall into nihilism and indifference? 
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Verity James-Sinetos: Phenomenology and Sexual Trauma 
This paper examines the phenomena of sexual trauma and its’ manifestations and effects from a 
phenomenological perspective. It extracts Merleau-Ponty’s theories expressed in Phenomenology of Perception 
and applies them to the phenomena of sexual trauma with a particular focus on embodiment, perception 
and his conception of the ‘schizophrenic’ subject.  
This paper is of a thematic nature, and looks in turn at the individual who has experienced sexual trauma 
and their phenomenological relationship with the body, time, memory and perception. This 
phenomenological analysis offers an alternative perspective to sexual trauma that breaks from the 
traditional psychoanalytic or psychiatric trajectory.   
My point of departure begins with the initial act of sexual trauma and how it is perceived by the human 
body as a perceptual apparatus. I will then explore the nature of the ‘disembodying’ act of sexual trauma 
and how this may manifest itself in specific bodily phenomena. Finally, I will posit the sexually traumatised 
individual in parallel to Merleau-Ponty’s ‘schizophrenic’ subject. I draw on R.D. Laing’s insights on 
schizophrenia to complement this juxtaposition. 
 I intend to create a new lens through which we can analyse sexual trauma as a perceptual phenomenon, 
within which the body as perceptual apparatus is fundamentally altered, consequently modifying the 
individual’s perception of the world and their place in it.  
 This paper provides a view of sexual trauma from a human, embodied, and lived-experienced 
perspective. It promises nor offers substantial or tangible answers or solutions to the problematic of sexual 
trauma, but instead provides a point of departure that aims to apprehend the experience of sexual  trauma 
phenomenologically, through spatial and temporal themes.  
Panel D: Phenomenology and Science 
Bence Marosan: Phenomenological biology: A proposal for future phenomenology 
Perhaps the most important question of phenomenology concerns the nature and origin of 
consciousness. The core of my paper is the thought that one cannot answer this question without the 
intensive research of lower levels of biological nature (first of all: the biology of lower level animals 
[invertebrata] and of microbes) and phenomenological reflections on these researches. That is to say: in 
my opinion the key to the progress of future phenomenology is a highly elaborated phenomenological 
biology. The intimate connection between phenomenology and biology has a long history and a 
widespread, rich context. We can find it in Husserl, who said that biology has “a special proximity to the 
sources evidence”, and “that its access to transcendental philosophy should be the easiest” (Husserliana 6: 
483), we can find it in Merleau-Ponty, and in the classical and contemporary authors of phenomenological 
anthropology, today – amongst others – in Eco-phenomenology and Neuro-phenomenology. So we can 
ask with a good reason: what would be the novelty of this present project in comparison with the a lready 
existing, biologically oriented phenomenological philosophies? I propose two, strongly related central 
topics for a future phenomenologically interpreted biology: the problem of demarcation of conscious and 
non-conscious living beings and the problem of information. My idea is that we can separate conscious 
and non-conscious beings from each other, and also unfold the very nature of consciousness, by a closer 
analysis of how organisms handle and process information. That is to say: in my opinion a phenomenology 
of information could help us to penetrate the shell of objectivity toward subjective immanence. There have 
been interesting attempts in this field in the last decades (e.g. Introna-Whittaker, 2003), but the most 
interesting, most exciting discoveries are still waiting to be achieved.   
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Emiliano Trizio: Science, metaphysics and the crisis of  rationality 
In this paper I criticize some of the current interpretations of Husserl’s notion of a crisis of Western 
sciences and provide an alternative reading that fits into Husserl’s overall theory of science. First, I highlight 
Husserl’s two preliminary constraints on the notion of crisis : 1) a science can be said to be in a crisis, only 
if its scientificity has become questionable; and, 2) the prima facie scientificity of (most of) our sciences is 
not questionable. This implies that what Husserl is looking for is a deeper sense of scientificity that, instead, 
has become questionable. This allows criticizing the common account of the crisis of sciences as “the loss 
of their meaning for life”, for the latter notion, while referring to a real and crucial phenomenon cannot 
be equated with a crisis of scientificity. It will appear that this perceived loss, which Husserl is far from 
denying, is used by Husserl as a starting point for a historical illustration of the fact that our sciences are 
just a residue of the idea of a universal philosophy culminating in a metaphysics that did bestow upon them 
significance for life. This will make possible to answer the crucial question underlying Husserl’s text: “how 
did the demise of the idea of universal philosophy impact the scientificity of the sciences?” The answer is 
worked out through a survey of part II of the Krisis, which highlights that what has become enigmatic is 
precisely the domain of being that they take as object. This fact constitutes the questionability of their 
deeper or authentic scientificity, and, thus, their real crisis. I conclude briefly outlining the relations between 
the crisis of metaphysics, the crisis of the sciences, and the general crisis of Western rationality.  
Panel E: Perception, Experience, and Intentionality 
Māra Grīnfelde: Is Unconditional Givenness Possible? Jean-Luc Marion’s Idea of  the Saturated 
Phenomenon Reconsidered 
French thinker Jean-Luc Marion is probably best known for his hypothesis of the `saturated 
phenomenon' (phénomène saturé), namely, a hypothesis of a phenomenon that is characterized through the 
excess of intuition over intention. Even though during the last two decades this hypothesis has been 
criticized from different perspectives, the common theme has been the criticism of the unconditional self-
givenness (donation de soi) of the saturated phenomenon. Although Marion has replied to some of the 
criticism, critics have remained unsatisfied. I want to argue that Marion is unable to convince some of his 
critics, because even though he uses one term (the saturated phenomenon), he actually refers to three 
different types of phenomena.  
The aim of this paper is to show that there are three types of the saturated phenomenon in Marion's 
phenomenology, based on the role and character of intuition within them, and to argue that criticism 
against the saturated phenomenon should be reassessed based on this differentiation. The paper shows 
that based on Marion's examples and descriptions of the saturated phenomenon, one should distinguish 
between internally differentiated intuitive givenness (idol, icon, flesh, the taste of wine, etc.), internally 
undifferentiated intuitive givenness (intuitive bedazzlement) and non-intuitive givenness (death, birth, 
time). It is argued that both in the first and third cases the saturated phenomenon loses its unconditional 
self-givenness. In the first case intuitive givenness remains inscribed in the horizon of nonconceptual 
meaning, thus losing its unconditional character; in the third case, non-intuitive givenness remains 
inscribed in the horizon of conceptual meaning, thus also losing its unconditional character. It is concluded 
that only the second type of the saturated phenomenon can retain its unconditional self-givenness and 
withstand the existing criticism directed against it.  
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Bernardo Ainbinder: Heidegger on colour-perception. A case for conceptualism in phenomenology 
In this paper, I will tackle a question that has been absent in the literature, namely, what is Heidegger’s 
conception of colour-perception. Heidegger himself, unlike many phenomenologists, including Husserl, is 
silent about the topic. There may a be a good reason for that: since he insists on the primacy of meaningful 
holistic coping with the world, considering colours as an isolated topic may well be the result of adopting 
a theoretical privative point of view on experience that Heidegger rejects. I think this approach to the 
problem is wrongheaded. Heidegger’s description of experience does not privilege some phenomena (say 
tools or meanings) vis-a-vis others (things, colours and the like) but a way of understanding experience in 
general (as organized in terms of a whole of meaningful relations where each single thing is defined by its 
normative import for the whole) vis-a-vis a a way of understanding it in terms of atomic items and stratified 
properties. I will call Heidegger’s conception of experience a normative  conceptual one (see Golob 2014). 
Against this background, in this paper I will explore what Heidegger has to say about colours. In 
particular, I will claim: 
1. that Heidegger’s description of Umsicht, i.e. the way of coping with the world as a meaningful whole, 
is not limited to the typical forms of practical coping he explicitly mentions but can be extended to the 
analysis of basic cases such as colour-perception. 
2. that such analyses provides some new and interesting insights into what perceiving colours means 
(some surprising points of contact with Sellars’ analysis in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind may 
be drawn here). 
3. that colours provide a prime example of Heidegger’s normative conceptual conception of experience.  
4. that some Heidegger-inspired approaches to the topic such as Kelly’s are misguided.  Kelly (2001) 
claimed that colour perception is a very good candidate to deny conceptualism, i.e . the thesis that contents 
of experience involve a form of articulation that is at least similar to the one expressed in judgment. I will 
claim, on the contrary, that colour perception is an excellent candidate to show in which sense 
conceptualism is true, precisely by analysing Kelly’s examples of colour sorting.  
Eric Chelstrom: Seriality and We-Intentions: A Sartrean Contribution to Collective Intentionality 
The collective intentionality literature focuses on we-intentions. Group actions and institutional 
practices are seen as being founded on we-intentions. That literature assumes of groups that they are 
intentional formations in which the participants are willfully participating. By contrast, groupings like 
gender, race, and class are better understood as on the model of seriality, as argued by Iris Marion Young. 
Young adopts the concept of seriality from Jean-Paul Sartre’s Critique of Dialectical Reason. Sartre’s 
notion of seriality is useful in understanding other block identity markers whose constituent members have 
not self-asserted their grouping. Sartre further had some influence on the development of the idea of false 
consciousness, developed in more detail by Simone de Beauvoir in relation to sexual identity and Frantz 
Fanon in relation to racial identity. While serial grouping and false consciousness may at first blush seem 
unconnected, both develop within Sartre’s thinking about how being-for-others affects one’s experience 
of the world. 
In this paper, I develop the Sartrean distinction of kinds of groups, voluntary and serial, and attempt to 
model the kinds of intentionality associated therewith in relation to the mode of intentionality of being-
for-others. In contrast to mainstream collective intentionality theory, it is argued that the two distinctive 
kinds of ‘we’ and their distinctive forms of we-intention need to be treated distinctly. Voluntaristic we-
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intentions are predicated from “within,” where the agents in question form their own plans and actions 
together. Serial we-intentions are formed from “without,” they are imposed on individuals by others. 
What’s more serial we-intentions inform voluntaristic we-intentions insofar as one’s self-understanding of 
one’s identity – in which serial categories are often principal – establishes horizons of possibility associated 
with how one understands one’s projects vis-à-vis voluntary actions.  If accurate, that represents a serious 
problem for mainstream (non-phenomenologically informed) approaches to collective intentionality.  
 Panel F: Edmund Husserl and his Legacy 
Uldis Vēgners: Husserl’s Time-Consciousness Reconsidered: A Case for a Changing Consciousness 
of  Change 
The question about the possibility of time-consciousness is among the most important ones in Husserl's 
phenomenology. Underneath his life-long attempts to come to a satisfactory solution lies a basic 
assumption that succession of consciousness by itself is not sufficient for consciousness of succession. 
However, the assumption itself is based upon a premise according to which each moment of succession 
excludes all the other moments of it. If it is true that one moment of a succession excludes all others then 
it is easy to see that succession of consciousness is not yet a consciousness of succession, because all this 
succession gives is an actual moment and not all the moments together. Thus the greatest difficulty for 
Husserl is to show how the moments that constitute succession are united or brought together so, as to 
give consciousness of succession. 
However, Husserl's adherence to the aforementioned premise has undermined his attempts to come to 
a satisfactory conception of time-consciousness. Either he has to accept a momentary nature of time-
consciousness, which does not present a change but only that something has changed and/or will change, 
or face other serious problems. In order to escape from the problems Husserl's conceptions of time-
consciousness face and to do justice to our changing consciousness of change, an alternative conception 
is proposed, one that is not based on the premise of mutual exclusion of successive moments. As it will be 
argued the premise not only leads to grave problems, it is also phenomenologically unwarranted. According 
to the proposed alternative conception moments of succession are not mutually exclusive, meaning that 
one moment can overlap with other moments. As it will be argued time-consciousness is constituted by a 
partial overlap of moments. 
Francesco Tava: History and Praxis: On the Milanese School of  Phenomenology 
The aim of this paper is shedding light on the reception of Husserl’s, as well as post -Husserlian 
phenomenology, in Italy, with special emphasis on the role that Antonio Banfi and Enzo Paci played in 
this peculiar philosophical context. Banfi and Paci are widely considered the most prominent 
representatives of the so-called “school of Milan”, which originated in the aftermath of the Second World 
War, and later developed especially during the 1960s and 70s, giving rise to a lively debate which 
encompassed phenomenology, existential philosophy, and Marxist theory. Particularly, the reception of 
phenomenology allowed these thinkers to draw a theoretical path which radically diverged from neo-
idealism, Christian thought, and historicism, the main philosophical trends in pre-war Italy. In this sense, 
Banfi’s contribution in spreading the early works of Husserl in the Italian philosophical context, as well as 
Paci’s reception of Husserl’s Crisis, also through the mediation of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, constituted a 
chapter in the history of phenomenology which has been often neglected. In order to bridge this gap, I 
will particularly focus on some topics which Paci introduced in The Function of Sciences and the Meaning  
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of Man (1963; English translation, 1972). In this work, Paci engaged a critical analysis of contemporary 
history, and of those ideologies, like capitalism and dogmatic Marxism, which attempted to interpret the 
historical process as something merely positive and constructive, overlooking the fundamental role that 
free and creative human praxis played within it. So doing, Paci fostered a theoretical encounter between 
phenomenological analysis and some of the most remarkable cultural trends which were spreading in 
Western and Eastern Europe at that time: critical Marxism, political dissidence, and counterculture. In this 
paper, I will try to show both the merits and the limits of this rather neglected page of phenomenology’s 
history, also in light of the most recent development of this discipline.  
Panel G: Phenomenology in Practice 
Philip Tovey: A Remote Outpost Under Siege: A phenomenological understanding of  officers and 
staff  operating under a new core operating model. 
Much is written about the increasing tightening and stifling effects of the current austerity measures 
UK Police Forces are contending with and a new, leaner, more efficient organisational structure is often 
the selected adapted action that ensures the organisations economic survival. This driver predisposes a 
quantitative approach to understanding the affects of change, fearing the intangible for is subjective 
complexity, its difficulty in translating into monetary measures and determinate outcomes; and, as this 
paper will argue, is encapsulated in existential uncertainty. The largest Policing assets base is in its human, 
and subsequently social capital; domains best suited to a qualitative understanding, there fore, this 
embedded study conducted phenomenological inquiry into the phenomena of policing in a new operating 
model as part of an organisational reshaping. Findings suggest an experiential essence of isolation and 
remoteness, a knowledge 'updraft', hollow promises and a classical moralistic composition of 'good vs bad' 
in the subjects policing raison d'etre; all of which contrasts sharply with an evolving operational reality. 
Phenomenology as a methodological approach to influencing organisational change is discussed before the 
constituent themes are explored through an existential phenomenological framework, highlighting 
potential implications for policing human resource management and development.  
Valeria Bizzari: Phenomenology and its usefulness in psychopathology: an “embodied” proposal 
In the last few years, the phenomenological method and several notions such as Leib, natural attitude, 
corporeal schema and so on, have started to be addressed to the explanation of psychiatric diseases like 
schizophrenia and depression. In fact, adopting a phenomenological approach to the study of illness 
seems to allow a fully understanding of the complexity of the human being and an improving of the 
therapeutical phase too, taking into account the subjectivity of the patient, the person behind the symptoms 
and the disruptions of the structures of consciousness.  
The aim of this paper is to describe how this could happen and to support the liceity of the usage of 
phenomenological tools in psychopathology, with a special attention to the issue of intersubjectivity. For 
this reason, after briefly comparing Simulation Theories and Theory Theories, I will support a phenomenological 
interpretation of the intersubjective experience and I will focus on those pathologies which seem to involve 
a disruption of the “Social Self”, such as schizophrenia and autism, and I will suggest that they are 
essentially intersubjective diseases caused by a weakness of the pre-reflective and corporeal self-awareness.  
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I will support my thesis with a “phenomenological test” that I have developed and applied on an 
Asperger subject: a semi-structured interview that, taking into account the phenomenological method and 
its principles, as well as stimulating the subject through images and questions about emotions and beliefs, 
has allowed an exploration of his (inter)subjective structures.  
In the last part of my talk, I will suggest a therapy focused on the fortification of intercorporeality and 
of bodily awareness: my conclusion will be that phenomenology could improve psychopathology not just 
methodologically but also in the treatment of the patients.  
Ingrid Wilkinson: Post-stroke changes in the embodied experience of  walking – moving beyond 
body structures, activity and participation 
Dr IA Wilkinson Hart1,2,  Dr P Taylor1,2,  Prof J Burridge1,  Dr J Wintrup1 
1Faculty of Health Sciences, University of Southampton, UK.  2Salisbury NHS Foundation Trust, UK. 
 
The gait rehabilitation research tends to investigate body structures, activity and participation in line 
with World Health Organisation definitions and rarely focuses on individual's lived experience.  This study 
appears to be the first to systematically explore walking from the perspective of individuals who have had 
a stroke. 
This study aimed to highlight valued aspects of walking to inform outcome measurement and future 
clinical trials.  Four interviews were undertaken using an interpretative phenomenological approach with 
people who were approximately three years post-stroke.  The participants spoke about walking within the 
context of activities that they identified as personally important.  They valued being able to walk distances 
at a reasonable speed, being independent, safe and confident.  They missed their pre-stroke spontaneity, 
freedom, agility and their lost automatic body movement.  The participants gave examples of post -stroke 
walking related changes in their self-perception, roles and embodied experience of walking that are rarely 
mentioned in the rehabilitation literature, apart from in personal accounts written by people living with 
chronic illness.  They described their new unreliable post-stroke body that caused them to feel vulnerable. 
Use of interpretive phenomenological analysis allowed an in depth exploration of walking and 
unanticipated themes emerged.  Participants spoke about their previously ‘taken for granted’ body that 
they thematised post-stroke.  This echoes Drew Leder's description of a body that recedes from our 
thoughts in health and advances to the foreground of our awareness in illness.  These participants also 
spoke about changes in their personal freedom and autonomy resulting from post -stroke walking 
difficulties.  Such ideas are found in philosophical publications but are rarely discussed in clinical 
rehabilitation journals.  The study reported here has explored the embodied experience of walking and 
dissemination could begin a debate that may improve care and outcome measurement and lead to a greater 
understanding of walking as a phenomenon. 
Panel H: Phenomenology of Education 
Emma Williams: The Ways We Think: Epistemology, Phenomenology and Education 
The significance of phenomenology for the field of education has been demonstrated in a number of 
ways (e.g. Shaun Gallaghar, 2016; Michael Peters, 2009; Paul Standish, 2002). My paper, which forms part  
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of a wider research project (Williams, 2016), aims to apply a phenomenological perspective to the 
educational question of critical thinking.  
Affirmed as an indispensable feature of Western education (c.f. Martha Nussbaum, 2010), the 
development of critical thinking today forms an essential part of the learning objectives of many courses 
and qualifications across school and higher education. Yet educational theorizations of critical thinking – 
the question of what it is, or should, amount to – remain contentious. My paper aims to show how a 
phenomenology of thinking opens up a richer and more robust conception of critical thinking that than which 
currently dominates educational discussion. 
My paper will take, as its point of departure, the influential, ‘epistemological conception’ of critical 
thinking developed by Harvey Siegel. Siegel (1998) has claimed, in response to Charles Taylor, that 
phenomenology leaves his account of critical thinking ‘pretty much as it is’; yet my paper will argue that 
Siegel’s dismissal of phenomenology is too hasty . By extending Taylor’s discussion, and in particular his 
appeal to the Heideggerian tropes of the ‘background’ and the Lichtung, I will argue that phenomenology 
affords a conception of the ways we think – and the human being who thinks – which radically exceed the 
epistemological. Key to this will be the claim that Heidegger’s philosophy moves us beyond a 
representational model of thinking and towards a new view of thought as receptivity and 
responsiveness. My paper will end by examining the educational implications of this phenomenologically 
inspired conception – both in terms of what is called, and what calls for, thinking in education today. 
Miles Kennedy: Where learning takes place: A phenomenological description of  Vygotsky’s Zone 
of  Proximal Development 
Anyone studying teaching practice and pedagogy in recent years will have heard of Lev Semenovich 
Vygotsky's theory of social constructivism and his trademark idea, the “Zone of Proximal Development” 
or ZPD. Vygotsky described this Zone as "the distance between the actual developmental level as 
determined by independent problem solving and the level of potential development as determined through 
problem solving under adult guidance, or in collaboration with more capable peers" (Vygotsky, 1978, p86). 
The Zone of Proximal Development, then, is more often than not described primarily in terms of 
“cognitive constructivism” thus remaining in territory similar to that mapped out by Piaget. This paper will 
apply a phenomenological descriptive method to contemporary classroom environments, influenced by 
Vygotsky's social constructivism, in order to bring to light a more concrete, lived version of this “Zone of 
Proximal Development”. By re-examining this very significant pedagogical approach in terms of a 
phenomenology of space, place and dwelling it is hoped that some value and insight can be brought to the 
fields of teaching practice and the phenomenology of education. 
 
Vygotsky L. (1978). Interaction between learning and development, mind and Society (pp. 79 -91) 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP 
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Panel I: Phenomenology and the Arts 
Jonathon Tuckett: The Talos Principle: When does a bot become a person? 
The current sophistication of bot software on the internet - particularly as they appear in chatrooms  - 
has given rise to situations in which internet users have struggled to distinguish between other "real" users 
and bots. But the question is, when does the bot become a "real" user itself? At core this is the question 
of philosophical anthropology: What is "Man"? And, whether AI and robots will someday constitute 
"Man" also. This question lies at the heart of the video game Talos Principle in which an AI program must 
"prove" its humanity. Similarly, films like I, Robot, Automata, and Ex Machina have implicitly addressed 
this question, and what makes these science fiction based examples interesting is how they centre on the 
theme of "deviance". In this respect they deviate from religious and social scientific responses to 
philosophical anthropology which have often centred on what I call the human prejudice: defining "Man" 
in terms of the biological human species.  
In this paper I will argue that these science fiction-based considerations present implicit responses to 
philosophical anthropology that are closer to the more explicit formulations found in the phenomenologies 
of Max Scheler and Jean-Paul Sartre. Particularly in their approaches to intersubjectivity, there is an attempt 
to escape this human prejudice through their considerations of how we know the Other is "present". This 
paper will argue that these science fiction based examples provide a "sociological" indicator of the validity 
of their thought in this area. 
Katrin Joost: Photographic Phenomenology 
We encounter photographs every day, in papers and magazines, on TV, online, through social media, 
as well as all sorts of information material. It therefore shapes how we understand the world as possibly 
photographed (Sontag, 1977). The ubiquity of photography is so prevalent that we do not notice it 
anymore. Yet, photography shapes our being in the world.  
According to Barthes' contemplation on photography (1980), it is a magical medium, since it is always 
of the particular and therefore disrupts the temporal flow and spacial logic of ordinary perception. Looking 
at, for example, the famous photograph The Terror of War,  (Ut, 1972), depicting children running from a 
South Vietnamese attack, we see a particular girl, Phan Thị Kim Phúc when she was burned by a napalm 
bomb. We see that instant in 1972 in the image. Photography can transport us to that moment and show 
that particular girl.  
Phenomenology reveals this fundamental aspect of photography. Moreover, photography itself can be 
seen as phenomenological investigation. Some photographic projects (e.g. Spence's A Picture of Health, 
1985) disclose the nature of phenomena through the visualisation of what it means to experience them 
(e.g. suffering from cancer). Photographic image production can go beyond the sheer depiction of objects 
and engage the viewer on a very intuitive level with the phenomena they are about. Phenomenological 
analysis of how the world appears to us through the eidetic reduction and epoché is a complex philosophical 
process that still tends to be confined to words. Photography, arguably can be used to perform similarly, 
but do so in a much more intuitive manner. Husserl's call to do phenomenology (HUA III) could be 
achieved through doing photography.  
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Niall Keane: Heidegger on the Experience of  Art, Truth, and Poetry 
This talk will address the intersections of art, truth, and poetry in two texts by Heidegger from the mid-
1930s. The first is the well-known 1935 essay “The Origin of the Work of Art”, and the second is a less 
well-known lecture Heidegger gave in 1936 entitled: “Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry” I shall argue 
that these texts function as building blocks when it comes to understanding the intersections of art, truth, 
and poetry in Heidegger’s work insofar as they address the ‘essence’ of art by taking up the question of the 
origin of art. Thus, these texts will serve as decisive indicators of Heidegger’s engagement with the 
experience of art, truth, and poetry in the1930s. Finally, these texts will be brought together with two of 
Heidegger’s post-war lectures from 1958 entitled “The Essence of Language” and “The Word”, which are 
meditations on the poetry of Stefan George. While there are notable differences of emphasis between these 
texts, I shall consider them as uniquely illustrative of the arc of Heidegger’s attempts to rethink the essence 
of ‘experience’ (Erfahrung), the ‘experience’ of works of art and of poetry in particular, and to focus on the 
transformative nature of the ‘experience’ that these encounters bring about. The dialogue with Hölderlin 
and George, emerging in the wake of Heidegger’s writing and rewriting of “The Origin of the Work of 
Art”, identifies a special lucidity in the relationship between thought  and poetry and the potentially 
transfigurative experience of language. It is precisely this transfigurative poeitic experience, insofar as it 
renders the human being more vulnerable and open to an experience of truth traditionally overlooked, 
which will be the focus of this talk.  
 
Rachel Coventry: Can Poetry break the Internet: A Heideggerian account of  Post-Internet Poetry 
Sam Riviere’s 2015 collection “Kim Kardashian’s Marriage” is an example of Post-Internet poetry. Post-
internet poetry is the practice of using Web content as the basis of poetry. This paper will attempt to show 
that a Heideggerian analysis can shed light on contemporary texts in a way that renews Heidegger’s poetic 
thought and calls it into question in the light of new poetic practices. Specifically, Rivierie’s collection will 
be considered in terms of Heidegger’s opposing accounts of both technology and poetry. Social media is 
often understood in terms of enframing and thus it contributes to the “extreme danger” of the information 
age and the marginalization of art.  However, this danger is accompanied by a saving power. Can a 
collection like Rivierie’s succeed in make the ‘danger’ of social media explicit?  
 
